In this paper, we investigate the quantitative importance of collective bargaining agreements for the observed fluctuations in Bulgarian labor markets. Following Maffezzoli (Rev Econ Dyn 4:860–892, 2001), we introduce a monopoly union into a real-business-cycle model with government sector. We calibrate the model to Bulgarian data for the period following the introduction of the currency board arrangement (1999–2018), and compare and contrast it to a model without unions. We find that the sequential bargaining procedure between the monopoly union and the stand-in firm produces an important internal propagation mechanism within the theoretical setup, which allows the monopoly model to fit data better than the alternative framework with perfectly-competitive labor markets.

中文翻译：

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工会对商业周期波动是否重要？保加利亚的教训

在本文中，我们研究了集体谈判协议对保加利亚劳动力市场中观察到的波动的量化重要性。遵循马菲佐利（Rev Econ Dyn 4：860–892，2001），我们将垄断联盟引入具有政府部门的真实商业周期模型中。在引入货币发行局安排（1999-2018年）之后，我们将模型校正为保加利亚的数据，并将其与没有工会的模型进行比较和对比。我们发现，垄断联盟与替身企业之间的顺序议价程序在理论框架内产生了重要的内部传播机制，这使垄断模型比具有完全竞争性劳动力市场的替代框架更适合数据。