We study non-organized boycott activities. We develop a boycott model where multiple consumers on the demand side fight against a misbehaved monopolist on the supply side. The goal of the boycott is to force the firm that lacks corporate social responsibility to change its behavior, for example, abandon polluting production technology towards environmentally friendly actions. We analyze consumers’ and firm’s incentives and equilibrium strategies. Our paper describes the difficulty of winning a non-organized boycott in reality. We find that consumers’ free riding incentives limit the real boycott power even when the benefits to free ride is small. The larger the market the firm serves, the more likely an individual consumer would stop boycotting (who acts as a strict environmentalist), which leaves fewer boycotters remaining in the costly conflict (who act as loyal supporters of the product). On the other hand, we show that the market size does not significantly affect the firm’s strategies. For a big firm, the consumer boycott will surely be effective, that is, lead to non-zero boycotter participation, but hardly successful, that is, not lead to the firm’s cessation of misbehavior.

中文翻译：

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非有组织的抵制：不平衡的消耗战中的联盟优势和搭便车激励

我们研究无组织的抵制活动。我们开发了抵制模型，其中需求方的多个消费者与供应方行为不端的垄断者作斗争。抵制的目的是迫使缺乏企业社会责任的公司改变其行为，例如，放弃污染生产技术，转向环保行动。我们分析了消费者和企业的激励和均衡策略。我们的论文描述了在现实中赢得无组织抵制的困难。我们发现，即使搭便车的收益很小，消费者的搭便车动机也会限制真正的抵制力量。公司所服务的市场越大，个人消费者就越有可能停止抵制（谁是严格的环保主义者），这使得抵制昂贵的冲突的抵制者减少了（抵制者是产品的忠实支持者）。另一方面，我们表明市场规模不会显着影响公司的战略。对于大公司而言，抵制消费者肯定是有效的，即导致抵制者参与非零，但很难成功，即不会导致公司停止不当行为。