Abstract

This article relies on a Polanyian-inspired theoretical framework to compare political economy strategies adopted by Brazilian governments after democratisation. Responding to competing interests from the financial sector, the manufacturing industry, and the working class, these governments have chosen between disembedded neoliberal, embedded neoliberal and neocorporatist strategies, facing different challenges and crises. After the short-lived adoption of disembedded neoliberalism in the early 1990s, embedded neoliberal governments were able to conciliate economic liberalisation and orthodox macroeconomic policies with political stability and social cohesion, while compensating the manufacturing industry and the working class for some of their losses. In the late 2000s, however, discontentment within these social groups with regard to insufficient economic growth opened the way for the emergence of neocorporatism, which eased the commitment to liberalisation and macroeconomic orthodoxy in order to expand industrial policies, social protection and labour market regulation. The crisis of neocorporatism, which culminated in the 2016 impeachment, provided a new opportunity for disembedded neoliberalism, putting the interests of the financial sector at the centre of policy formulation.

摘要

本文依靠受波兰尼启发的理论框架来比较巴西政府在民主化后采用的政治经济战略。为应对来自金融部门、制造业和工人阶级的竞争利益，这些政府在脱嵌的新自由主义、嵌入的新自由主义和新公司主义战略之间做出选择，面临不同的挑战和危机。在 1990 年代初期短暂采用非嵌入式新自由主义之后，嵌入式新自由主义政府能够在经济自由化和正统宏观经济政策与政治稳定和社会凝聚力之间进行调和，同时补偿制造业和工人阶级的一些损失。然而，在 2000 年代后期，这些社会群体内部对经济增长不足的不满为新公司主义的出现开辟了道路，新公司主义减轻了对自由化和宏观经济正统观念的承诺，以扩大产业政策、社会保护和劳动力市场监管。以 2016 年弹劾告终的新公司主义危机为脱胎换骨的新自由主义提供了新机会，将金融部门的利益置于政策制定的中心。