ABSTRACT

Can value allocation be left to managerial discretion and does corporate law provide the basis for a balanced stakeholder management and a fair allocation of results? This question is central in an age of inequality. We argue that it can be reappraised by building upon the case of maritime law. Whereas in corporate law, the board is in charge of allocating the results, maritime law stipulates a clear ex ante rule according to which it allows a captain to sacrifice some goods to save the ship. This historical ‘rule of general averages’ emerged in Antiquity. It compels the interested parties to jointly bear costs. This rule makes visible what we call a ‘partnering effect’ of managerial authority and suggests that corporate law, as it currently stands, lacks a conceptualization of the impacts of managerial discretion and therefore limits the possibility of a fair allocation of results. While management scholars have sought to rethink management theory with a ‘view from law’, we conclude that law could also be discussed with a view from management history.

摘要

价值分配能否留给管理者酌处权，公司法是否为平衡的利益相关者管理和公平分配结果提供了基础？在不平等时代，这个问题至关重要。我们认为，可以在海事法的基础上重新评估它。在公司法中，董事会负责分配结果，而海事法则明确规定事前允许船长牺牲一些物品以拯救船的规则。这项历史上的“一般平均值规则”出现在上古时期。它迫使有关方面共同承担费用。该规则使我们称之为管理权力的“伙伴效应”可见，并表明，就目前而言，公司法缺乏对管理自由裁量权影响的概念化，因此限制了公平分配结果的可能性。尽管管理学者试图用“法律观点”重新思考管理理论，但我们得出的结论是，也可以从管理历史的角度来讨论法律。