We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a law had higher leverage, delayed loss recognition, made more risky and fraudulent loans, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873 to 1878. These effects were most pronounced for bankers with the largest reduction in liability. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level.

中文翻译：

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对于更富有，更贫穷：1867年至1880年在新英格兰的银行家的责任和银行风险

我们研究了如果管理人员的负债减少，银行是否会更具风险。我们将重点放在1867年至1880年之间的新英格兰地区，并考虑引入婚姻财产法，该法律限制了新婚银行家的责任。我们发现，在1873年至1878年的大萧条时期，拥有依法结婚的经理人的银行具有更高的杠杆率，延迟的损失确认，产生更多的风险和欺诈性贷款，以及损失了更多的资本和存款。最大的责任减少。我们没有发现限制责任增加县级公司投资的证据。