The earlier studies on the effects of entry in a downstream market where vertically-related and symmetric retailers resell a product purchased from an upstream manufacturer propose that if the downstream market is monopolized by the incumbent retailer and/or the (inverse) consumer demand function is linear, then the equilibrium wholesale price charged by the upstream manufacturer is invariant to the entry of his new downstream retailers. Consequently, in accordance with the conventional economic wisdom, entry raises the downstream-market quantity, lowers the consumer price therein and reduces the incumbent retailer’s profits. We disclose that all those effects of downstream entry under restrictive market conditions are reversed with the presence of a vertically-related retailer who serves a separate (and asymmetric) market in the distribution channel. Contingent on the degree of asymmetry on demand potential between two markets and the extent of product substitutability, downstream entry may: (1) have a positive/negative spillover effect on the upstream manufacturer’s equilibrium wholesale price; (2) raise both the downstream-market quantity and consumer price; and/or (3) increase the incumbent retailer’s profit. All those and other effects of entry in downstream markets adduced in extant literature vary with demand- and competition-related factors across downstream markets in a distribution channel.

早期研究在垂直相关和对称的下游市场进入的影响零售商转售从上游制造商那里购买的产品，建议如果上游市场由现任零售商垄断和/或（逆）消费者需求函数是线性的，那么上游制造商收取的均衡批发价格对于他的新下游零售商。因此，按照传统的经济观点，进入增加了下游市场的数量，降低了其中的消费者价格，并降低了现有零售商的利润。我们披露，在限制性市场条件下，下游进入的所有这些影响都可以通过垂直相关零售商的存在来逆转，该零售商提供独立的（且不对称的）服务）市场中的分销渠道。取决于两个市场之间需求潜力的不对称程度和产品可替代性的程度，下游进入可能：（1）对上游制造商的均衡批发价格产生正向/负向溢出的影响；（2）提高下游市场数量和消费价格；和/或（3）增加现有零售商的利润。现有文献中提到的下游市场进入的所有这些和其他影响，会随着分销渠道中下游市场中与需求和竞争相关的因素而变化。