Adjectives such as “environmental”, “social”, “cosmopolitan”, “relational”, “distributive”, etc. reflect how scholars discern the many faces of justice and put several claims to, and claimants of, justice in perspective. They have also helped related research to focus on some surfaces of justice, that is, on spaces that invite justice, localities and formations, such as the state, social policies, social institutions, etc. within which ethical-political challenges unravel. Diverse philosophical perspectives enable context-specific explorations of (sur)faces of justice. However, I argue, there is more to the concept of justice than what perspectives (considered alone or in their sum total) allow us to view. To theorize how this surplus may be more discernible through stereoscopic rather than perspectival optics I first describe how educational-philosophical perspectives, old and new, discuss just education or education for justice; and then I critique the very notion of perspective on which scholarly work relies. Despite their merits, perspectival framings of justice fail to address the interconnectivity of various (sur)faces of justice.

中文翻译：

---

那还不是全部：教育哲学中的（Sur）正义面孔

诸如“环境的”，“社会的”，“世界主义的”，“关系的”，“分配的”等形容词反映了学者如何看待正义的许多面孔，并从角度对正义提出了若干主张和主张。他们还帮助相关研究将重点放在了正义的某些方面，即在那些需要正义，地方和组织形式的空间中，例如国家，社会政策，社会制度等，在其中展开了伦理政治挑战。多样的哲学观点使得对（正义的）正义面孔的上下文特定探索成为可能。但是，我认为，正义的概念比允许我们观察的观点（单独考虑或综合考虑）更多。为了从理论上而不是透视光学理论上弄清这种盈余，我首先描述新旧的教育哲学观点如何讨论教育或正义教育。然后我批评学术工作所依赖的视角这一概念。尽管具有优点，但透视性的司法框架无法解决各种司法（司法）面孔之间的相互关系。