The present contribution describes the nature of social practices based on habitual behavior. The first part concerns the notion of “habit” from a perspective that crosses philosophy and science. Habits structure our daily life and possess a social nature, as shown by informally shared habits and institutionalized rituals. After a brief reference to the philosophical debate, we point out the fundamental dimensions of habitual behavior, i.e., routine and goal-directed behavior. They also characterize shared social habits like rituals because we need to: (a) simply follow social institutional practices and (b) actively cooperate to reach a certain goal. Our descriptive strategy aims at promoting the aspect of “control” in habitual behavior, namely, the possibility of accepting or refusing to do something. This control does not work in many pathological cases and cases of auto-illusion. The second part of the article will illustrate the interesting but disregarded case of the epistemic and moral embubblement, explaining it as an individual cognitive process and as a specific social practice that once followed or institutionalized becomes a shared practice routinely performed. The main features of an epistemic bubble concern the widespread situation in which the cognitive agents always resolve the tension between their thinking that they know P and their knowing P in favor of knowing that P”. The related case of the moral bubble indicates the situation in which agents are potentially or actually violent and unaware of it. This cognitive process expresses how difficulties in recognizing one’s own violence leads to disregarding the possible or actual inflicted harm: in this case, a process of what can be called “autoimmunity” is at play. We will contend that the concept of moral bubble can provide an integrated and unified perspective able to interpret in a novel way many social practices in which morality and violence are intertwined.

中文翻译：

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社会实践与浮雕

本文稿描述了基于习惯行为的社会实践的性质。第一部分从跨越哲学和科学的角度关注“习惯”的概念。习惯构成我们的日常生活，并具有社会性质，如非正式分享的习惯和制度化的礼仪所表明的那样。在简要讨论哲学辩论之后，我们指出了习惯行为的基本方面，即例行行为和目标行为。它们还具有共同的社会习惯，如仪式的特征，因为我们需要：（a）只需遵循社会制度做法，并且（b）积极合作以达到某个目标。我们的描述性策略旨在促进习惯行为中“控制”的方面，即接受或拒绝做某事的可能性。此控制在许多病理情况和自体幻觉中均无效。本文的第二部分将说明有趣的但被忽略的认识论和道德论争的案例，将其解释为一个个人的认知过程，以及作为一种特定的社会实践，一旦遵循或制度化，便会成为常规执行的共享实践。认知泡沫的主要特征涉及广泛的情况，在这种情况下，认知主体总是解决他们所知道的思想之间的张力。将其解释为个人的认知过程和特定的社会实践，一旦遵循或制度化，便会成为日常惯例。认知泡沫的主要特征涉及广泛的情况，在这种情况下，认知主体总是解决他们所知道的思想之间的张力。将其解释为个人的认知过程和特定的社会实践，一旦遵循或制度化，便会成为日常惯例。认知泡沫的主要特征涉及广泛的情况，在这种情况下，认知主体总是解决他们所知道的思想之间的张力。P和他们的认识P赞成知道P ”。道德泡沫的相关情况表明了代理人潜在或实际暴力而没有意识到的情况。这种认知过程表明，认识到自己的暴力行为的困难如何导致无视可能或实际造成的伤害：在这种情况下，所谓的“自身免疫”过程正在发挥作用。我们将争辩说，道德泡沫的概念可以提供一个综合和统一的观点，能够以新颖的方式解释道德和暴力交织在一起的许多社会实践。