We investigate how variation in initial conditions, which assign individuals into advantaged or disadvantaged positions, alters behavior. We illustrate the problem within a labor market context and consider the impact of accumulated debt on wage selectivity. Using a two-period model, we show that debt exerts a non-monotonic effect on wage selectivity, with agents assigned low and high levels of debt being significantly more likely to reject an initial wage offer than agents with moderate debt. This prediction is supported by our experiment, which finds a statistically significant dip in wage selectivity for subjects assigned moderate levels of debt.

中文翻译：

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绝命毒师：当处于不利地位时会激励（看似）冒险行为

我们调查初始条件的变化如何改变行为，将个人分配到有利或不利的位置。我们在劳动力市场背景下说明了这个问题，并考虑了累积债务对工资选择性的影响。使用两期模型，我们表明债务对工资选择性产生非单调效应，与债务中等的代理人相比，被分配低和高债务水平的代理人更有可能拒绝初始工资提议。这一预测得到了我们的实验的支持，该实验发现被分配中等债务水平的受试者的工资选择性在统计上显着下降。