This paper analyzes the labor–employer relations during conditions that lead to strike using an evolutionary game and catastrophe theory. During a threat to strike, the employers may accept the whole or only a part of the demands of labors and improve the work conditions or decline the demands, and each selected strategies has its respective costs and benefits. The threat to strike action causes the formation of a game between the strikers and employers that in which, as time goes on, different strategies are evaluated by the players and the effective variables of strike faced gradual and continuous changes, which can lead to a sudden jump of the variables and push the system to very different conditions such as dramatic increase or decrease in the probability of selecting strategies. So the alliance between labors could suffer or reinforce. This discrete sudden change is called catastrophe. In this study after finding evolutionary stable strategies for each player, the catastrophe threshold analyzed by nonlinear evolutionary game and the managerial insight is proposed to employers to prevent the parameters from crossing the border of the catastrophe set that leads to a general strike.

本文使用进化博弈和巨灾理论分析了导致罢工的条件下的劳资关系。在罢工威胁中，用人单位可以接受全部或部分劳动要求，并改善工作条件或拒绝要求，每种选择的策略都有其各自的成本和收益。罢工行动的威胁导致罢工者与雇主​​之间形成博弈，随着时间的推移，参与者会评估不同的策略，罢工的有效变量将面临逐渐而连续的变化，这可能导致突然的变化。变量的跳跃并将系统推到非常不同的条件，例如选择策略的可能性急剧增加或减少。因此，劳动之间的联盟可能会遭受打击或加剧。这种离散的突然变化称为灾难。在本研究中，在为每个参与者找到了稳定的进化策略之后，通过非线性进化博弈和管理洞察力分析了巨灾阈值，以防止雇主越过巨灾集的边界而导致大罢工。