How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.

中文翻译：

---

威权政体与军民关系：解释独裁制的平衡

专制国家如何构建其军民关系？我们认为，与其他威权政体类型相比，个人主义独裁者与制衡关系更为密切。个人主义者的特征是机构薄弱，支持基础狭窄，缺乏统一的意识形态以及与统治者的非正式联系。因此，他们有强烈的动力去发动政变，而且正如我们所主张的那样，平衡似乎特别具有吸引力。自1960年代以来对专制政权的平衡努力进行的定量分析为这一期望提供了支持。通过证明政府政变在专制政府形式上有很大不同，我们为有关比较专制主义和军民关系的文献做出了贡献。