I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.

中文翻译：

---

重新考虑经济杠杆和脆弱性：贸易关系，制裁威胁和经济胁迫的成功

我认为，一个国家在全球贸易网络中的地位会影响制裁威胁的产生和结果。当一个国家的贸易对与全球贸易网络有良好联系的贸易伙伴而言价值较低时，它就很脆弱，因此更可能默认。相反，当一个国家的贸易对原本没有良好联系的贸易伙伴具有高价值时，它具有可以激发使用制裁威胁的杠杆作用。通过两个网络集中度度量之间的交互来捕获杠杆/漏洞，结果表明漏洞与制裁的默认发生有关，而杠杆与威胁发起有关。