Trade–conflict studies have shown that economic dependence can promote peace by costly signaling resolve. However, with higher economic integration, targets also become more vulnerable to coercion and potential challengers are incentivized to bluff. In return, target states may resist more, raising the question of whether trade still promotes peace. I theorize that bluffing does not stoke conflict in this context because the bargaining environment allows states to inform and coerce simultaneously: the factor that renders a threat less credible also restrains states from further escalation. I test this theory’s implications with a structural estimation method and find supporting results.

中文翻译：

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向和平虚张声势：尽管欺骗和不确定性增加，但经济依赖如何促进和平

贸易冲突研究表明，经济依赖可以通过代价高昂的决心信号来促进和平。但是，随着经济一体化程度的提高，目标也变得更容易受到胁迫，并且潜在的挑战者被激励虚张声势。作为回报，目标国家可能会抵制更多，提出了贸易是否仍在促进和平的问题。我认为，在这种情况下虚张声势不会引发冲突，因为讨价还价的环境允许各国同时进行通报和强制执行：使威胁不那么可信的因素还限制了国家进一步升级。我使用结构估计方法测试了该理论的含义，并找到了支持的结果。