This paper analyzes the political economy causes of fiscal promise gaps, defined as the distance between planned fiscal objectives and actual realizations during planned fiscal expansions periods. Using a sample of 27 European Union countries between 1992 and 2015, we identify, by means of an “hybrid” narrative approach, 68 episodes of promised fiscal expansions. We show that expansionary promise gaps were sizeable (about 1.5–2.5% of GDP during an average fiscal expansion episode) and that initial and economic conditions matter in explaining their size. We also find that the more leftist a government is, the larger the expansionary promise gap. Governments facing weak opposition in the parliament and those more effective are characterized by smaller expansionary promise gaps. Regarding the importance of decentralization and the role played by subnational governments, the larger their capacity to influence national legislation and policy, the larger the promise gaps.

中文翻译：

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承诺的财政扩张和政治：欧盟评估

本文分析了财政承诺差距的政治经济学原因，财政承诺差距被定义为计划财政扩张期间计划财政目标与实际实现之间的距离。使用 1992 年至 2015 年间 27 个欧盟国家的样本，我们通过“混合”叙述方法确定了 68 次承诺的财政扩张。我们表明，扩张承诺缺口相当大（在平均财政扩张时期约为 GDP 的 1.5-2.5%），并且初始和经济条件对解释它们的规模很重要。我们还发现，政府越是左翼，扩张性承诺的差距就越大。在议会中面临弱反对的政府和那些更有效的政府的特点是扩张性承诺差距较小。