Abstract A century ago, Alfred Marshall demonstrated the inefficiency associated with farmers receiving only a portion of their marginal product. Farmers will supply less labor than under arrangements in which they receive their marginal product; output will be sub-optimal. Explanations of sharecropping are based on market imperfections, e.g., high transactions costs or inability to insure against risk, suggesting that sharecropping should disappear with economic development. Nevertheless, sharecropping survives. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, sharecropping has no legal status but farm surveys provide evidence of its existence. Despite farmers’ awareness of the Marshallian paradox, institutional uncertainty contributes to the persistent attractiveness of sharecropping.

中文翻译：

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佃农为何能幸存？哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦的农业制度和合同选择

摘要 一个世纪前，阿尔弗雷德·马歇尔 (Alfred Marshall) 证明了与农民仅获得其边际产品的一部分相关的低效率。与获得边际产品的安排相比，农民将提供更少的劳动力；输出将是次优的。对佃农的解释是基于市场不完善，例如高交易成本或无法保证风险，表明佃农应该随着经济发展而消失。尽管如此，佃农仍然存在。在哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦，佃农没有法律地位，但农场调查提供了它存在的证据。尽管农民意识到马歇尔悖论，但制度的不确定性导致了佃农的持续吸引力。