Standard models of indirect price discrimination generate a separating equilibrium in which all consumers choose bundles on their demand curves. Low-demand consumers voluntarily choose to pay a higher unit price for small quantities because the discount is offered by the monopolist at prohibitively high quantity. These models implicitly assume the low-demand consumer would purchase the higher quantity at the discounted price if the quantity requirement were set at a low quantity, but rational monopoly pricing avoids this. We show that it is possible for a monopolist to offer price/quantity bundles that induce each consumer to choose voluntarily the one preferred by the monopolist for her where each bundle is above the respective consumer’s demand curve. The primary theoretical results include greater profits for the firm and greater total efficiency as output more closely approaches the socially optimal level in both market segments. Resolving an ambiguity from earlier research on price discrimination, the model also unequivocally demonstrates that consumer surplus is reduced. An important implication of the monopolist constraining consumption to be above the demand curve for her product is that she has effectively reduced the demand for some subset of other goods and services the consumers purchase.

中文翻译：

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重新思考二级价格歧视市场中的利润最大化

间接价格歧视的标准模型产生了一个分离均衡，其中所有消费者都在其需求曲线上选择束。低需求的消费者自愿选择为小批量支付更高的单价，因为垄断者以过高的数量提供折扣。这些模型隐含地假设，如果数量要求设置为低数量，低需求消费者将以折扣价购买更多数量，但理性垄断定价避免了这种情况。我们表明，垄断者有可能提供价格/数量捆绑，诱使每个消费者自愿选择垄断者喜欢的捆绑，其中每个捆绑都高于相应消费者的需求曲线。主要的理论结果包括随着产出更接近两个细分市场的社会最优水平，公司的利润增加和总效率增加。该模型解决了早期价格歧视研究中的歧义，还明确表明消费者剩余减少了。垄断者将消费限制在其产品的需求曲线之上的一个重要含义是，她有效地减少了消费者购买的其他商品和服务的某些子集的需求。