When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is raining, what is the thing that I know? The contemporary response is to say that what I know is the proposition “that it is raining”. Propositions are also the objects of belief: when I believe that it is raining, it is the proposition “that it is raining” that I believe. I am a proponent of the more controversial view that the object of my knowledge is the rain itself. I am the subject, and the object is the rain. A problem for this more controversial view is how to make sense of the objects of failed knowledge – when I merely believe that it is raining, for example. The rain itself cannot be the object of my belief if it is not raining – so what can be? In this article I will try to defend my view from this pressing objection: I will argue that it is possible for non-existent objects to be the objects of belief.

当我知道某事时，我所了解的对象是什么？例如，当我知道正在下雨时，我知道什么？当代的回应是说，我所知道的是“下雨了”的命题。命题也是信念的对象：当我相信下雨时，我相信的是“正在下雨”的命题。我支持更具争议性的观点，即我所知的对象是下雨本身。我是主题，而对象是下雨。这种更具争议性的观点存在的一个问题是，如何理解失败的知识的对象-例如，当我仅认为正在下雨时。如果不下雨，那么下雨本身就不能成为我的目标，那么怎么办？在本文中，我将努力捍卫自己的观点，以免受到迫切的反对：不存在的对象成为信念的对象。