ABSTRACT

When we discuss skepticism, we generally mean a certain philosophical movement with a fundamental basis in doubt. At the same time, the history of philosophy gives us another highly productive, methodologically oriented interpretation of skepticism as a psychological state of mind that forces the author to draw a veil over his thoughts. That said, we consider it important that epistemological skepticism, both in its traditional versions and in its modern epistemological conceptions, is not a self-sufficient position. Doubt acquires methodological effectiveness only when, through verbal-conceptual mediation, it brings with it a semiotic-symbolic interpretation of the reality directly given to us. This philosophical-methodological idea, which our article attempts to substantiate, is by no means a universally accepted one. Nevertheless, it was the center of attention for the philosopher Gustav Shpet, who argued for the semiotic-symbolic nature of humanitarian reality, and for the poet Boris Pasternak, who embodied this method of “indirect exposition” in his work. Pasternak attended Shpet’s seminar on Hume, where he emphasized the idea that the forward momentum of cognition is ensured by the skeptical position of the cognizing subject who subjectivizes knowledge. This idea remains relevant today. We believe this is the situation in science as a whole, including even those areas of natural science most divorced from directly accessible experience. These dynamics of methodological standpoints associated with doubt reveal, in an obvious way, their effectiveness in the field of humanitarian knowledge and creativity. To support this argument, our article uses historical-philosophical argumentation based on archival materials.

摘要

当我们讨论怀疑主义时，我们通常指的是某种具有怀疑基础的哲学运动。同时，哲学史为我们提供了另一种高效的，以方法论为导向的对怀疑主义的解释，这种解释是一种心理状态，迫使作者在其思想上蒙上一层面纱。话虽如此，我们认为认识论怀疑论在传统形式和现代认识论概念中都不能自给自足。怀疑只有在通过言语概念调解为直接赋予我们的现实带来符号符号解释时，才获得方法论上的效力。我们的文章试图证实这一哲学方法论思想，但这绝不是一个普遍接受的思想。尽管如此，这是哲学家古斯塔夫·施佩特（Gustav Shpet）和人道主义诗人鲍里斯·帕斯捷尔纳克（Boris Pasternak）的关注焦点，古斯塔夫·施佩特（Gustav Shpet）主张人道主义现实的符号符号性质，他在作品中体现了这种“间接阐释”的方法。Pasternak参加了Shpet关于休ume的研讨会，他在会议上强调了这样一种观念，即认知的主体对知识的主观怀疑会确保其前进的动力。这个想法在今天仍然适用。我们认为，这就是整个科学的局面，甚至包括那些自然科学领域中与直接可访问的经验最脱节的领域。与怀疑有关的方法论观点的这些动态以明显的方式揭示了它们在人道主义知识和创造力领域的有效性。为了支持这一论点，