ABSTRACT

We challenge effective altruism (EA) on the basis that it should be more inclusive regarding the demands of altruism. EA should consider carefully agents’ intentions and the role those intentions can play in agents’ moral lives. Although we argue that good intentions play an instrumental role and can lead to better results, by adopting a Hutchesonian perspective, we show that intentions should, first and foremost, be considered for their intrinsic value. We examine offsetting and geoengineering, two so-called solutions to climate change supported by EA, to highlight the limitations of a narrow understanding of altruism.

中文翻译：

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我们能做的最好的人还是我们能做的最好的人？

摘要

我们在有效利他主义（EA）的基础上对利他主义的要求更具包容性的挑战。EA应当仔细考虑代理人的意图以及这些意图在代理人的道德生活中可以发挥的作用。尽管我们认为善意发挥了重要作用，并且可以带来更好的结果，但是通过采用哈钦森主义的观点，我们表明，应该首先考虑善意的内在价值。我们考察了抵消和地球工程这两个由EA支持的所谓的解决气候变化的解决方案，以强调对利他主义的狭understanding理解的局限性。