ABSTRACT

In this study, I investigate whether the economic bond between an individual audit engagement partner and a client threatens auditor independence (and thus audit quality). As the propensity of the auditor to issue going-concern modified audit opinions (GCOs) is lower when there is auditor independence impairment, I examine to which extent fee dependency leads to a lower propensity to issue GCOs. Using archival data from Belgian private companies, I empirically examine a sample of 18,638 companies for the period 2008–2010 to test for the effect of the auditor-client bond on the audit opinion. None of my results support common concerns that client importance undermines auditors’ GCO reporting decisions, neither at the firm level nor at the partner level. Specifically, I find no evidence for a negative association between the likelihood that an auditor issues a GCO and the economic importance of that client to the auditor (firm or partner). These results are supported by analyses on an additional sample of 5,934 companies for the period 2011–2013. Despite broad concerns among academics and regulators about auditor independence and economic bonding, this is one of the first studies to investigate this issue at the partner level and for private clients.

摘要

在这项研究中，我调查了单个审计业务合伙人与客户之间的经济纽带是否威胁到审计师的独立性（进而威胁审计质量）。由于在存在审计师独立性损害时，审计师发出持续经营的经修改审计意见的可能性较低，因此我研究了费用依赖性在多大程度上导致了发行GCO的倾向较低。我使用比利时私营公司的档案数据，对2008-2010年间18,638家公司的样本进行了实证研究，以检验审计师-客户债券对审计意见的影响。我的结果没有一个普遍支持的担忧是，无论在公司层面还是在合作伙伴层面，客户的重要性都会破坏审计师的GCO报告决策。具体来说，我发现没有证据表明审计师签发GCO的可能性与该客户对审计师（公司或合伙人）的经济重要性之间存在负相关关系。这些结果得到了2011-2013年期间对5,934家公司的额外样本分析的支持。尽管学者和监管机构广泛关注审计师的独立性和经济联系，但这是在合作伙伴级别和针对私人客户调查此问题的首批研究之一。