ABSTRACT

The aims of this study are twofold: first, to determine whether bankrupt firms manipulate signed accruals upwards compared with active firms with similar performance, and second, whether the regulatory environment influences pre-bankruptcy manipulation. Using the performance-matched discretionary accrual model and 500 firm-year observations, this study finds that bankrupt firms manipulate signed accruals upwards. Further, it examines subsamples of positive and negative accruals manipulation in the lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the heavily regulated Main Market. Analysis of the first subsample reveals that bankrupt firms delisted from AIM manipulate accruals upwards more than bankrupt firms delisted from the Main Market. These results suggest that managers in bankrupt AIM firms have greater incentive and ability to manipulate accruals upwards compared with managers in Main Market firms. Finally, analysis of the negative accruals manipulation subsample shows that AIM bankrupt firms manipulate accruals downwards more than Main Market bankrupt firms.

摘要

这项研究的目的是双重的：首先，确定破产公司与具有类似业绩的活跃公司相比，是否会操纵已签署的应计利润；其次，监管环境是否会影响破产前的操纵。该研究使用与绩效匹配的自由裁量权应计模型和500个公司年度观察值，发现破产公司会向上操纵已签署的应计项目。此外，它还检查了在管制松散的另类投资市场（AIM）和管制严格的主市场中对应计收益进行正向和负向操作的子样本。对第一个子样本的分析表明，从AIM退市的破产公司比从主要市场退市的破产公司操纵的应计利润更高。这些结果表明，与主要市场公司的经理相比，破产的AIM公司的经理具有更大的动机和向上操纵应计费用的能力。最后，对负应计制操纵子样本的分析表明，AIM破产公司对应计制的操纵幅度要比主要市场破产公司低。