Yelena Biberman offers a new framework for understanding why and how states ‘outsource’ war to local non-state actors despite the risks of forfeiting the state’s monopoly over violence. Specifically, she explores state and non-state alliances in counter-insurgencies in India and Pakistan. Taking a qualitative approach, Biberman argues that ‘state-nonstate alliances are balance-of-interests bargains’ wherein the ‘state seeking to shift the local balance of power in its favor may enlist activists if it can cultivate social or ideological ties with them’ (p. 12). She finds that non-state actors who are ‘opportunists are more likely to serve as balance tippers’ in a conflict (p. 12). Biberman provides a useful approach for scholars to understand the ‘outsourcing of violence’, by drawing on a range of primary source material and field research, including over 200 interviews, news media, memoirs, and official government records. The book is divided into three sections. The first explores the theoretical framework and situates the study within current scholarship. Biberman details how the research design employs process tracing to understand how the insurgencies unfolded and defines key terms, such as the different types of key actors as ‘activists’ or ‘opportunists’. The activists’ interests are in ideological goals, whereas the ‘opportunists are largely transactional, characterized by pragmatic quid-pro-quo agreements’ (p. 26). Incorporating neoclassical realism from international relations theory, Biberman connects neo-realism’s focus ‘on the structuring role of relative power distribution in an anarchic system with classical realism’s appreciation of actors’ divergent interests and agency’ (p. 29). In the much lengthier second part, Biberman provides empirical analyses of four different case studies. She begins by exploring Pakistan’s need to reach out to local populations in 1971 to fight against the escalating insurgency in East Pakistan. Examining the Islamist ‘volunteers’ – some who joined willingly due to religious or material appeals, and others who were coerced through violence – she finds Pakistan’s plausible deniability was lacking ‘because (1) it was too militarily weak to attract opportunists, and (2) it had not yet built the socio-ideological links needed to attract activists’ (p. 63). Moving to India’s counterinsurgency in Kashmir from 1988 to 2003, Biberman explores India’s efforts to gain local allies which proved more successful after the balance of power in the conflict tipped in the government’s Strategic Analysis, 2020 Vol. 44, No. 2, 153–155, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1726621

中文翻译：

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暴力赌博：巴基斯坦和印度的国家战争外包

叶莲娜·比伯曼 (Yelena Biberman) 提供了一个新框架，用于理解国家为何以及如何将战争“外包”给当地的非国家行为者，尽管存在丧失国家对暴力的垄断权的风险。具体而言，她探讨了印度和巴基斯坦反叛乱中的国家和非国家联盟。比伯曼采用定性的方法，认为“国家与非国家联盟是利益平衡的交易”，其中“寻求改变地方权力平衡有利于自己的国家可能会招募积极分子，如果它能够与他们建立社会或意识形态联系” （第 12 页）。她发现，作为“机会主义者”的非国家行为者更有可能在冲突中充当“平衡推手”（第 12 页）。比伯曼通过借鉴一系列原始资料和实地研究，为学者们提供了一种有用的方法来理解“暴力外包”，包括 200 多次采访、新闻媒体、回忆录和官方政府记录。本书分为三个部分。第一个探索理论框架并将研究置于当前学术范围内。Biberman 详细介绍了研究设计如何使用过程追踪来了解叛乱是如何展开的，并定义了关键术语，例如不同类型的关键参与者是“激进主义者”或“机会主义者”。激进主义者的利益在于意识形态目标，而“机会主义者主要是交易性的，以务实的交换条件为特征”（第 26 页）。结合国际关系理论中的新古典现实主义，比伯曼将新现实主义的重点“在无政府系统中相对权力分配的结构作用与古典现实主义对参与者不同利益和代理的欣赏”（第 29 页）联系起来。在更长的第二部分，比伯曼提供了四个不同案例研究的实证分析。她首先探讨了 1971 年巴基斯坦需要与当地居民接触以打击东巴基斯坦不断升级的叛乱。审查伊斯兰主义“志愿者”——一些是由于宗教或物质诉求而自愿加入的，而另一些则是通过暴力胁迫——她发现巴基斯坦缺乏合理的否认，“因为（1）它在军事上太弱，无法吸引机会主义者，以及（2） ）它还没有建立吸引活动家所需的社会意识形态联系（第 63 页）。谈到印度 1988 年至 2003 年在克什米尔的平叛，比伯曼探讨了印度争取当地盟友的努力，事实证明，在政府战略分析，2020 年卷。44, No. 2, 153–155, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1726621