I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.

中文翻译：

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对年幼的孩子有良好的见证感

我提出了幼儿的证明知识对美德信赖主义者的知识提出的挑战。特别是，我检查了Greco和Pritchard的帐户，并认为这些帐户要求太高。更具体地说，我认为幼儿可以在不满足Greco和Pritchard要求的能力要求的情况下拥有推荐知识。作为美德理论的替代品，我认为代理人的信念必须在认识论上是道德的，但这有时可能涉及特质而非能力的信念。