In this article, I expound and assess two theories of meaning in life informed by the indigenous sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. According to one view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes community with other human persons. According to the other view, a life is more meaningful, the more it promotes vitality in oneself and others. I argue that, at least upon some refinement, both of these African conceptions of meaning merit global consideration from philosophers, but that the vitality approach is more promising than the community one for capturing a wider array of intuitions about what confers meaning on a life. I further argue, however, that there are objections that apply with comparable force to both theories; neither one does a good job of entailing that and explaining why certain types of reason and progress can make a life more meaningful. Although these objections are characteristic of a “modern” Western outlook, I maintain that they are difficult for contemporary African philosophers to ignore, and consider some ways they might respond to the objections.

中文翻译：

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非洲生命意义理论：批判性评估

在本文中，我阐述并评估了撒哈拉以南非洲土著哲学传统为生命提供的两种意义理论。根据一种观点，生活越有意义，就越能促进与其他人的社区生活。另一种观点认为，生活越有意义，就越能促进自己和他人的活力。我认为，至少在某种程度上，这两种非洲意义的概念值得哲学家进行全球考虑，但是生命力方法比社区方法具有更大的希望，因为它可以捕获关于赋予生命意义的更广泛的直觉。但是，我进一步指出，有些异议适用于两种理论，它们具有可比性。没有人能很好地做到这一点，并解释了为什么某些类型的理性和进步可以使生活变得更有意义。尽管这些异议是西方“现代”观点的特征，但我坚持认为，当代非洲哲学家很难忽略它们，并思考他们可能会如何回应这些异议。