ABSTRACT The ‘unification’ of the United States Army and Navy under the 1947 National Security Act, combined with efforts to cut expenditures after the Second World War, spawned vicious inter-service competition that undermined civilian control of the military. The nastiest feuds were between the Air Force and Navy, and then the Navy and civilian leaders of the fledgling Department of Defence. What appears as an esoteric dispute over the utility of bombers versus aircraft carriers was merely the tip of a larger struggle over the future of American military strategy. Civilian efforts to end this destructive inter-service rivalry and force the military to live within its budgetary constraints provoked open defiance during the so-called ‘Revolt of the Admirals’ in 1949. National Security Council Paper 68 offered a way out of this predicament by outlining a quasi-Keynesian fiscal policy based on rearmament that would stimulate the economy enough to offset the additional defence spending.

中文翻译：

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“我们的努力已经退化为美元的竞争”。“海军上将起义”、NSC-68 和冷战的政治经济学

摘要 美国陆军和海军在 1947 年《国家安全法》下的“统一”，加上二战后削减开支的努力，催生了恶性的军种间竞争，削弱了文职人员对军队的控制。最严重的争执发生在空军和海军之间，然后是海军和初出茅庐的国防部的文职领导人。关于轰炸机与航空母舰效用的深奥争论似乎只是关于美国军事战略未来的更大斗争的一角。在 1949 年所谓的“海军上将起义”期间，平民为结束这种破坏性的跨军种竞争并迫使军队生活在其预算限制内的努力激起了公然反抗。