ABSTRACT The aim of the current study is to discuss which particular factors Russia considers as sufficient deterrent capabilities and whether the national defence models implemented in the Baltic countries have the potential to deter Russia's military planners and political leadership. Whilst the existing conventional reserves of NATO are sizeable, secure, and rapid, deployment is still a critical variable in case of a conflict in the Baltic countries because of the limited range of safe transportation options. However, whilst the Baltic States are developing their capabilities according to the priorities defined by NATO in 2010; which were updated after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, Russian military planners have meanwhile redesigned both their military doctrine and military forces, learning from the experience of the Russo-Georgian war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and other recent confrontations. Accordingly, there is a risk that the efforts of the Baltic countries could prove rather inefficient in deterring Russia.

中文翻译：

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波罗的海国家和北约在波罗的海威慑俄罗斯的道路上是否走在正确的道路上？

摘要 本研究的目的是讨论俄罗斯认为哪些特定因素具有足够的威慑能力，以及在波罗的海国家实施的国防模式是否具有威慑俄罗斯军事规划者和政治领导层的潜力。虽然北约现有的常规储备规模庞大、安全且迅速，但由于安全运输选择范围有限，部署仍然是波罗的海国家发生冲突时的一个关键变量。然而，虽然波罗的海国家正在根据北约 2010 年确定的优先事项发展其能力；在 2014 年入侵克里米亚后更新，俄罗斯军事规划者同时重新设计了他们的军事学说和军队，从俄罗斯 - 格鲁吉亚战争的经验中学习，俄罗斯与乌克兰的冲突，以及其他近期的对抗。因此，波罗的海国家的努力有可能在威慑俄罗斯方面效率低下。