ABSTRACT

On Jaeggi's reading, the immanent and progressive character of ideology critique are rooted in the connection between its explanatory and its normative tasks. I argue that this claim can be cashed out in terms of the mechanisms involved in a functional explanation of ideology and that stability plays a crucial role in this connection. On this reading, beliefs can be said to be ideological if (a) they have the function of supporting existing social practices, (b) they are the output of systematically distorted processes of belief formation, (c) the conditions in which distorting mechanisms triggers can be traced back to structural causal factors shaped by the social practice their outputs are designed to support. Functional problems thus turn out to be interlocked with normative problems because ideology fails to provide principles to regulate cooperation that would be accepted under conditions of non-domination, hence failing to anchor a stable cooperative scheme. By explaining ideology as parasitic on domination, ideology critique points to the conditions under which cooperation stabilize as those of a practice whose principles are accepted without coercion. Thus, it entails a conception of justice whose principles are articulated as part of a theory of social cooperation.

摘要

在Jaeggi的阅读中，意识形态批判的内在和进步特征植根于其解释性任务与规范性任务之间的联系。我认为，这种主张可以根据意识形态的功能解释所涉及的机制来兑现，并且稳定性在这方面起着至关重要的作用。在这种解读中，如果（a）它们具有支持现有社会实践的功能，（b）它们是系统扭曲的信念形成过程的输出，（c）扭曲机制触发的条件可以追溯到由其产出旨在支持的社会实践形成的结构性因果因素。因此，功能性问题与规范性问题相互关联，因为意识形态未能提供规范在非支配条件下可以接受的合作的原则，因此未能建立稳定的合作方案。通过将意识形态解释为寄生于统治，意识形态批判指出了合作稳定的条件，即其原则在没有强制的情况下被接受的实践。因此，它需要一种正义概念，其原则被阐明为社会合作理论的一部分。意识形态批判指出了合作稳定的条件，即其原则在没有强制的情况下被接受的实践。因此，它需要一种正义概念，其原则被阐明为社会合作理论的一部分。意识形态批判指出了合作稳定的条件，即其原则在没有强制的情况下被接受的实践。因此，它需要一种正义概念，其原则被阐明为社会合作理论的一部分。