ABSTRACT

This paper aims at examining the way in which Rahel Jaeggi’s conception of forms of life as inert bundles of practices is connected to the problem of the possibility of an immanent critique of life forms, that is, of a kind of analysis that is both internal and transformative. In the first part, my contention will be that understanding practices in terms of conventions makes it difficult to admit of internal criticisms of them. Jaeggi’s account of immanent critique, as argued in the second part, tries to differentiate practices from social conventions by maintaining that transformations of life forms can be seen as the result of episodes of crises ignited by the inability to cope with “second order” problems. I maintain that, unless one is willing to postulate something like an absolute telos dictating the historical sequence that forms of life must follow, the way in which forms of life solve second order problems displays some conventional features preventing any quick assimilation to the paradigm of immanent critique. This circumstance, as argued in the third section of my presentation, poses an obstacle to Jaeggi’s project of an immanent critique of life forms.

摘要

本文旨在研究 Rahel Jaeggi 将生命形式作为惰性实践束的概念与对生命形式的内在批判的可能性问题联系起来的方式，即一种既是内在的又是内在的分析。变革性的。在第一部分，我的论点将是，从惯例的角度理解实践使得难以接受对它们的内部批评。正如第二部分所讨论的，Jaeggi 对内在批判的描述试图通过坚持认为生命形式的转变可以被视为因无法应对“二阶”问题而引发的危机事件的结果来区分实践与社会习俗。我坚持认为，除非有人愿意假设像绝对的最终目的生命形式必须遵循的历史顺序，生命形式解决二阶问题的方式显示了一些传统特征，阻止了对内在批判范式的任何快速同化。正如我在演讲的第三部分所论证的那样，这种情况对 Jaeggi 对生命形式进行内在批判的计划构成了障碍。