ABSTRACT

In this paper, I analyse Rahel Jaeggi’s socio-ontological account of forms of life. I show that her framework is a two-sided one, since it involves an understanding of forms of life both as inert bundles of practices and as having a normative structure. Here I argue that this approach is based on an a priori argument which assumes normativity as the condition of intelligibility of social criticism. I show that the intimate tension between these two sides is reflected in the socio-ontological model of the constitution of social phenomena, which on the one side is understood in terms of habituation and materialization, and on the other side in terms of constitution through norms. The second side in the end prevails and leads to some sort of normative essentialism which involves a prescriptive meta-theoretical understanding of normativity combined with a socio-ontological model of constitutive rules. I then analyse two arguments that Jaeggi offers in support of her assumption that normative constitution is the deep structure of social practices. I name these the functional-teleological argument, and the crisis developmental argument, and argue that neither succeeds in proving that practices are not normatively underdetermined.

摘要

在本文中，我分析了 Rahel Jaeggi 对生命形式的社会本体论解释。我表明她的框架是一个双向的框架，因为它涉及对作为惰性实践束和具有规范结构的生命形式的理解。在这里，我认为这种方法是基于先验论点，该论点假设规范性是社会批评的可理解性条件。我表明，这两个方面之间的亲密张力反映在社会现象构成的社会本体论模型中，该模型一方面是从习惯化和物化的角度来理解的，另一方面是通过规范来理解构成的。 . 第二面最终占了上风，并导致了某种规范本质主义，这涉及对规范性的规定性元理论理解与构成规则的社会本体论模型相结合。然后我分析了 Jaeggi 提供的两个论点，以支持她的假设，即规范性宪法是社会实践的深层结构。我将这些命名为功能目的论论点和危机发展论点，并认为两者都不能成功地证明实践并非在规范上未确定。