Abstract

The next step in the use of innovative, dynamic and performance-based contracts for service delivery by contractors could be use of monetary incentives to stimulate self-regulation of the network. Because it is currently unclear how performance-based payments in network tenders can effectively encourage network members to coordinate their own operations, a serious game was performed that simulates road maintenance planning to study changes in decision making and the emergence of network coordination. The experiments show that monetary incentives influence decision making, but their effect may be opposite to their intended aim and can lead to a competitive network. It was, however, also found that this competitiveness is not shown in networks where members are familiar with each other. This leads to the conclusion that penalty-based incentive mechanisms probably interfere with self-regulation and that the social dimension of contractor collaboration is paramount to the success of network-based contracting of construction activities.

摘要

承包商将创新，动态和基于绩效的合同用于服务交付的下一步可能是使用金钱激励措施，以刺激网络的自我监管。由于目前尚不清楚网络招标中基于绩效的付款如何有效地鼓励网络成员协调其自身的运营，因此进行了一场严肃的游戏，该游戏模拟了公路养护计划，以研究决策变更和网络协调的出现。实验表明，货币激励会影响决策制定，但其效果可能与预期目标相反，并可能导致竞争网络。但是，还发现，在成员彼此熟悉的网络中没有显示出这种竞争力。