ABSTRACT Successive Myanmar governments have enlisted illiberal means in attempts to end the world’s oldest civil wars. Since the 1990s, state-led attempts at peace-building have offered ethnic armed groups limited political autonomy or institutional recognition. Many of the 1990s ceasefire agreements, and the new wave agreed since the transition to partial civilian rule in 2011, have instead sought to erode insurgent legitimacy and control over local populations through encroachment of state-led development initiatives and elite resource extraction rackets into restive regions. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork conducted during periods of ceasefire in Kachin (1994–2011) and Karen States (2012–2019), this article explores how illiberal peace-building has inflamed tensions between ‘insurgent social order’ and the central state over who and how development is brokered and delivered. While illiberal peace sustains economic and political activity, attempts by the central state to cut insurgent social order out from the mediation and regulation of public goods can provoke intense grassroots conflict within insurgent groups and with the state. Violence looms as a proximate possibility in these contexts despite elite ceasefire, creating what we term ‘peri-conflict’ peace.

中文翻译：

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周边冲突和平：缅甸边境地区的经纪，发展和非自由停火

摘要缅甸历届政府都采取了自由手段，试图结束世界上最古老的内战。自1990年代以来，国家主导的建立和平的尝试使民族武装团体获得了有限的政治自主权或机构认可。自1990年过渡到部分平民统治以来，1990年代的许多停火协议以及新一波的协议都已试图通过将国家主导的发展举措和精英资源开采的into俩蚕食到动荡的地区来侵蚀叛乱的合法性和对当地居民的控制。借鉴克钦邦（1994-2011）在停火期间进行的定性野外工作，本文探讨了非法建设和平如何激怒了“叛乱社会秩序”与中央政府之间的紧张关系，即谁和如何促进和实现发展。虽然自由和平维持着经济和政治活动，但中央政府企图从公共物品的调解和管制中削减叛乱社会秩序的尝试，可能会激起叛乱组织内部以及与国家的基层冲突。尽管有精英停火，但在这些情况下暴力迫在眉睫，创造了我们所谓的“冲突冲突”和平。中央政府企图从公共产品的调解和管制中削减叛乱社会秩序的尝试，可能会激起叛乱组织内部以及与国家的基层冲突。尽管有精英停火，但在这些情况下暴力迫在眉睫，创造了我们所谓的“冲突冲突”和平。中央政府企图从公共产品的调解和管制中削减叛乱社会秩序的尝试，可能会激起叛乱组织内部以及与国家的基层冲突。尽管有精英停火，但在这些情况下暴力迫在眉睫，创造了我们所谓的“冲突冲突”和平。