ABSTRACT For states undergoing turbulent processes of democratisation, illiberal peace-building allows for management of civil war with the lowest political risks. However, the existing literature on illiberal peace-building does not explain why transitional governments sometimes opt for more liberal and negotiated means to manage conflict, despite the risks involved. To explore this question, the paper draws on original primary sources and secondary evidence to draw a novel comparison between the newly democratic Indonesian government’s management of two civil wars. Papua and East Timor form an ideal comparative case study as the government took starkly different approaches to managing conflict in each region, within the same time period, and under similarly moderate leadership. East Timor’s conflict was eventually resolved via liberal methods, while the Papua conflict was managed via illiberal means. I argue that two analytical dimensions need greater recognition within the illiberal peace-building approach to explain this difference. First, the role of shifting internal power balances within national political elites needs further interrogation. Second, the influence of external actors on internal power balances needs wider recognition.

中文翻译：

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东帝汶和巴布亚的自由和非自由和平建设：在民主化国家中建立秩序

摘要对于经历动荡的民主化进程的国家，建立自由的和平可以使内战的政治风险降至最低。但是，关于非法建设和平的现有文献没有解释为什么过渡政府有时会选择更自由和谈判的方式来管理冲突，尽管存在风险。为了探讨这个问题，本文利用原始的原始资料和辅助证据，对新民主的印尼政府对两次内战的管理进行了新颖的比较。巴布亚和东帝汶形成了一个理想的比较案例研究，因为政府在同一时期内，在同样温和的领导下采取了截然不同的方式来处理每个地区的冲突。东帝汶的冲突最终通过自由主义的方法得以解决，而巴布亚冲突则是通过自由手段解决的。我认为，在解释这种差异的非自由和平建设方法中，需要更多地认识两个分析方面。首先，在国家政治精英内部转移内部力量平衡的作用需要进一步的审讯。第二，外部行为者对内部权力平衡的影响需要得到广泛认可。