ABSTRACT This paper examines the Thai state’s approach in tackling the separatist movements in Thailand’s predominantly Malay-Muslim South. Developing upon Lewis et al.’s concept of Authoritarian Conflict Management, I argue that the state has largely employed an authoritarian mode to respond to the resurgence of violent rebellion since 2004, with the military taking dominant roles. Illiberal peace-building, largely influenced by Thai Cold War counterinsurgency doctrine, has extended not only to spatial, discursive and economic domains, but also to the legal realm. A nationally driven peace process initiated in 2013 was a departure from the state’s long-standing modus operandi. It was a period in which national elites experimented with a relatively more liberal approach. The Kuala Lumpur-facilitated process sparked both inter- and intra-group contention and soon collapsed due to the effect of unending battle between the so-called democracy camp and the royalist-establishment camp. The trajectory of the formalised dialogue took a significant turn after the 2014 coup. While retaining the process, the military regime turned it into an extended domain of illiberal peace-building.

中文翻译：

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未经谈判的对话：泰国南部的自由和平建设

摘要本文研究了泰国政府在泰国以马来穆斯林南方为主的对付分离主义运动中的做法。基于刘易斯等人的威权冲突管理概念，我认为，自2004年以来，该州已在很大程度上采用了威权模式来应对暴力叛乱的复兴，而军事则起着主导作用。受到泰国冷战平叛理论影响很大的非自由和平建设，不仅扩展到空间，话语和经济领域，而且还扩展到法律领域。2013年启动的由国家推动的和平进程与该州长期以来的作案手法背道而驰。在那个时期，国家精英们尝试了相对宽松的方法。吉隆坡推动的进程引发了集团内部和集团内部的争执，并由于所谓的民主阵营和保皇派建立阵营之间的无休止的战斗而很快瓦解。在2014年政变后，正式对话的轨迹发生了重大变化。在保留这一进程的同时，军事政权将其转变为扩大的非法建立和平领域。