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Detecting Clandestine Reprocessing Activities in the Middle East
Science & Global Security ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2018-01-02 , DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2018.1446540
Michael Schoeppner 1
Affiliation  

ABSTRACT Remote monitoring of krypton-85 from undeclared reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel could be part of a fissile material cut-off treaty, could serve as an additional measure for the IAEA safeguards system to monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, and could be an important verification tool of a reprocessing moratorium or Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East or East Asia. Atmospheric transport modelling is applied to determine the area over which krypton-85 emissions from undeclared reprocessing activities at various levels in the Middle East would still be detectable against the high krypton-85 background from reprocessing in historical weapon programs in the United States and USSR as well as more recent and ongoing commercial reprocessing in France and the U.K. Analysis of annual wind flow over Israel's Dimona facility, the only operating reprocessing site in the region, suggests that a known reprocessing plant could be monitored with one or a few fixed monitoring stations. Random air sampling for krypton-85 analysis, perhaps using drones, may be feasible for reliable and timely detection of clandestine reprocessing plants against the krypton-85 background but would require on the order of 50–100 air samples per day. Ending reprocessing at La Hague in France and at Sellafield in the UK and the resulting decline of the krypton-85 background over time would reduce to about 10 the number of daily samples required to monitor the Middle East.

中文翻译:

检测中东的秘密后处理活动

摘要 对未申报的乏核燃料后处理产生的氪 85 进行远程监测可以成为裂变材料禁产条约的一部分,可以作为 IAEA 保障体系的一项额外措施,以监测《不扩散核武器条约》的遵守情况,并可能成为中东或东亚后处理暂停或无核武器区的重要核查工具。应用大气传输模型来确定在美国和苏联历史武器计划后处理产生的高氪 85 背景下,中东各级未申报后处理活动产生的氪 85 排放仍可检测到的区域,如以及法国和英国最近和正在进行的商业后处理 对以色列迪莫纳设施(该地区唯一运营的后处理场所)的年度风流量的分析表明,可以通过一个或几个固定监测站来监测已知的后处理工厂。用于氪 85 分析的随机空气采样,也许使用无人机,对于在氪 85 背景下可靠和及时地检测秘密后处理厂可能是可行的,但每天需要大约 50-100 个空气样本。结束在法国拉海牙和英国塞拉菲尔德的后处理以及由此导致的氪 85 背景随着时间的推移而下降,将使监测中东所需的每日样本数量减少到大约 10 个。建议可以用一个或几个固定监测站监测一个已知的后处理厂。用于氪 85 分析的随机空气采样,也许使用无人机,对于在氪 85 背景下可靠和及时地检测秘密后处理厂可能是可行的,但每天需要大约 50-100 个空气样本。结束在法国拉海牙和英国塞拉菲尔德的后处理以及由此导致的氪 85 背景随着时间的推移而下降,将使监测中东所需的每日样本数量减少到大约 10 个。建议可以用一个或几个固定监测站监测一个已知的后处理厂。用于氪 85 分析的随机空气采样,也许使用无人机,对于在氪 85 背景下可靠和及时地检测秘密后处理厂可能是可行的,但每天需要大约 50-100 个空气样本。结束在法国拉海牙和英国塞拉菲尔德的后处理以及由此导致的氪 85 背景随着时间的推移而下降,将使监测中东所需的每日样本数量减少到大约 10 个。
更新日期:2018-01-02
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