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Physical Public Templates for Nuclear Warhead Verification
Science & Global Security Pub Date : 2020-01-02 , DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2020.1728885
Alexander Glaser 1 , Boaz Barak 2 , Moritz Kütt 3 , Sébastien Philippe 1
Affiliation  

Abstract Passive gamma spectroscopy has been successfully used for nuclear warhead inspection systems based on the template-matching approach. The most prominent example of such a system is Sandia’s Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS), which is based on an earlier system used at Pantex since 1994 to confirm the identities of containerized plutonium pits. Remarkably, TRIS uses only 16 energy bins, i.e., 16 numbers, to accomplish this task. Additional experiments have shown that such a template-matching method could be performed in a way that does not reveal classified information. To be used in a real inspection setting, however, inspectors must gain confidence that the system hardware and software work as designed and display genuine measurements through a process known as authentication. It also requires establishing and maintaining confidence in the template, i.e., that the data characterizing the treaty accountable item is genuine and has not been altered. In the case of TRIS, the template data are stored electronically and signed as a whole, such that no information about the template can ever be shared with inspectors as a confidence-building measure. Here, we propose an inspection protocol that uses a different approach: Information is stored in the form of punched cards that encode the secret template. Public masks can be used to reveal selected features of the template, e.g., total counts in particular energy bins, while keeping others secret, constraining certain physical properties of the treaty accountable item and providing increasing levels of transparency. We illustrate our approach using Princeton’s Information Barrier Experimental II based on a vintage 6502 processor.

中文翻译:

核弹头验证的物理公共模板

摘要 被动伽马能谱已成功应用于基于模板匹配方法的核弹头检测系统。这种系统最突出的例子是桑迪亚的可信辐射识别系统 (TRIS),它基于 Pantex 自 1994 年以来用于确认容器化钚坑身份的早期系统。值得注意的是,TRIS 仅使用 16 个能量箱,即 16 个数字来完成此任务。其他实验表明,这种模板匹配方法可以以不泄露机密信息的方式执行。然而,要在实际检测环境中使用,检测人员必须确信系统硬件和软件按设计工作,并通过称为身份验证的过程显示真实的测量结果。它还需要建立并保持对模板的信心,即表征条约责任项目的数据是真实的且未被更改。在 TRIS 的情况下,模板数据以电子方式存储并作为一个整体进行签名,因此作为建立信任的措施,任何有关模板的信息都不能与检查员共享。在这里,我们提出了一种使用不同方法的检查协议:信息以对秘密模板进行编码的穿孔卡片的形式存储。公共掩码可用于显示模板的选定特征,例如,特定能量箱中的总计数,同时保持其他人的秘密,限制条约责任项目的某些物理属性并提供更高水平的透明度。
更新日期:2020-01-02
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