Abstract We present neutrino-based options for verifying that the nuclear reactors at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center are no longer operating or that they are operating in an agreed manner, precluding weapons production. Neutrino detectors may be a mutually agreeable complement to traditional verification protocols because they do not require access inside reactor buildings, could be installed collaboratively, and provide persistent and specific observations. At Yongbyon, neutrino detectors could passively verify reactor shutdowns or monitor power levels and plutonium contents, all from outside the reactor buildings. The monitoring options presented here build on recent successes in basic particle physics. Following a dedicated design study, these tools could be deployed in as little as one year at a reasonable cost. In North Korea, cooperative deployment of neutrino detectors could help redirect a limited number of scientists and engineers from military applications to peaceful technical work in an international community. Opportunities for scientific collaboration with South Korea are especially strong. We encourage policymakers to consider collaborative neutrino projects within a broader program of action toward stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.

中文翻译：

---

基于中微子的朝鲜核核查和外交工具

摘要 我们提出了基于中微子的选项，用于验证朝鲜宁边核研究中心的核反应堆是否不再运行或它们以商定的方式运行，从而排除武器生产。中微子探测器可能是对传统验证协议的相互认可的补充，因为它们不需要进入反应堆建筑物内部，可以协作安装，并提供持久和特定的观察。在宁边，中微子探测器可以被动地验证反应堆关闭或监测功率水平和钚含量，所有这些都来自反应堆建筑物的外部。此处介绍的监测选项建立在基本粒子物理学最近取得的成功基础上。经过专门的设计研究，这些工具可以在短短一年内以合理的成本部署。在朝鲜，中微子探测器的合作部署有助于将数量有限的科学家和工程师从军事应用转向国际社会的和平技术工作。与韩国进行科学合作的机会特别大。我们鼓励政策制定者在更广泛的行动计划中考虑合作中微子项目，以实现朝鲜半岛的稳定与安全。