ABSTRACT This article presents a novel application of an inspection game to find optimally efficient nuclear safeguard strategies. It describes a methodology that allocates resources at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspectorate seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The methodology couples a simultaneous-play game theoretic solver with a probabilistic model for simulating state violation scenarios at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The simulation model features a suite of defender options based on current International Atomic Energy Agency practices and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair. To generate a scenario payoff, it weights the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until Nash equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection and proliferation strategies. The value the attacker places on material quantity and quality is varied to generate results representative of states with different capabilities and goals. Sample model results are shown to illustrate the sensitivity of defender and attacker strategy to attacker characteristics.

中文翻译：

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核保障选择和优化的博弈论方法

摘要 本文介绍了一种新的检查博弈应用，以寻找最有效的核保障策略。它描述了一种在核燃料循环设施内和核燃料循环设施之间分配资源的方法，用于寻求检测国家促进的转移或滥用的成本受限的检查机构。该方法将同步博弈论求解器与概率模型相结合，用于模拟气体离心浓缩厂的状态违规场景。该模拟模型具有一套基于当前国际原子能机构实践的防御者选项和一个类似的攻击者扩散途径选项菜单。模拟通过计算给定检查员-扩散者策略对的检测概率来通知博弈论求解器。为了产生场景收益，它通过获得材料的数量和质量来衡量检测概率。使用修改后的虚拟游戏算法，游戏迭代调用模拟模型，直到达到纳什均衡并输出最佳检查和扩散策略。攻击者对材料数量和质量的重视是多种多样的，以生成代表具有不同能力和目标的状态的结果。示例模型结果显示了防御者和攻击者策略对攻击者特征的敏感性。攻击者对材料数量和质量的重视是不同的，以生成代表具有不同能力和目标的状态的结果。示例模型结果显示了防御者和攻击者策略对攻击者特征的敏感性。攻击者对材料数量和质量的重视是多种多样的，以生成代表具有不同能力和目标的状态的结果。示例模型结果显示了防御者和攻击者策略对攻击者特征的敏感性。