ABSTRACT In Rinrigaku, Watsuji Tetsurō criticizes Martin Heidegger's Being and Time for taking as its starting point the standpoint of the individual “I.” For Watsuji, this “I” is an abstraction, and starting from it leads the phenomenologist to neglect the more fundamental standpoint of the person who is deeply engaged in social activities. In this paper, I explain that Watsuji's criticism is helpful in shedding light on Heidegger's failure to connect hermeneutic phenomenology to ethics in Being and Time. In particular, it is helpful in understanding the shortcomings of Heidegger's account of authenticity, which in Being and Time is juxtaposed with Dasein's immersion in social relations. I go on to argue, however, that Heidegger had made a more significant connection between hermeneutic phenomenology and ethics earlier, in his 1924 Marburg lectures on Aristotle (Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy), where his treatment of being-with-one-another resonates with Watsuji's later account of betweennness (aidagara).

中文翻译：

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存在的真正可能性：Watsuji、海德格尔和中介的首要性

摘要在《轮回》中，和二哲郎批评马丁·海德格尔的《存在与时间》以个体“我”的立场为出发点。对Watsuji来说，这个“我”是一种抽象，从它出发导致现象学家忽视了深入参与社会活动的人的更基本的立场。在这篇论文中，我解释说 Watsuji 的批评有助于阐明海德格尔未能将诠释学现象学与《存在与时间》中的伦理学联系起来。尤其有助于理解海德格尔关于本真性的说明的缺陷，即在《存在与时间》中与此在对社会关系的沉浸并列。然而，我继续争辩说，海德格尔早些时候在解释学现象学和伦理学之间建立了更重要的联系，