This paper will examine how Derrida treats the asymmetry between past and future. The claim underlying this paper is that my title question is pivotal in examining issues of time and temporality in Derrida’s work, and that this question has not been addressed in the literature. Only after examining this question will I turn to other issues in Derrida’s treatment of the future and of time in general. I will conclude by considering some of the possible implications for deconstruction. Given the importance of time for the conceptualization of deconstruction, these implications may be serious. Derrida has said that time can only be thought from the present. In Speech and Phenomena, specifically, Derrida says that “‘time’ has always designated a movement conceived in terms of the present, and can mean nothing else” (Derrida 1973, 68; 1967, 77). Is this so clear? Is it, to use the Derridean term, undeniable? Perhaps time can be thought starting from the difference between past and future, the difference between memory and expectation, between regret and hope, relief and fear. The past is set, the future is open; the past can be known and the future cannot. A trace is, in thefirst instance, a trace of thepast. Is there also a trace of the future? InSpeech and Phenomena, Derrida sets uphis concept of the “trace” initiallywith reference toHusserl’s concept of retention. Retention is the past “retained” within the present; it is a non-presence within the present; likewise, for the trace.We can ask if the same is true for protention. If it is also a trace, then the concept of tracewould set up the symmetry between past and future. It is not so easy to answer this question, and the difficulty in determining the answer–because this difficulty reveals something about Derrida’s hesitations and commitments – is as important as what the answer is. For this reason, I will track Derrida’s account of the trace in its relation to time in Speech and Phenomena and “Différance,” and elsewhere. If time is taken to mean the asymmetry between past and future, then we would have to rethink the concept of “metaphysics.” Metaphysics would still be the denial of time, but from this new perspective, it would consist of a philosophical view which effaced the difference between past and future. This view would overlap with – but delimit – Derrida’s account of metaphysics, since the privileging of presence would still be metaphysical, but as only one way of effacing time. The possibility is thus raised that deconstruction is itself metaphysical if, even if it relentlessly interrogates and challenges “presence,” it effaces the difference between past and future. No doubt this sounds very straightforward – too straightforward for those who know Derrida’s work. We all know that Derrida’s thought is one of complications. What are we

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有未来的踪迹吗？德里达的形而上学与时间

本文将考察德里达如何处理过去与未来之间的不对称。这篇论文背后的主张是，我的标题问题在检查德里达作品中的时间和时间问题时至关重要，而这个问题在文献中没有得到解决。只有在研究了这个问题之后，我才会转向德里达对未来和一般时间的处理中的其他问题。最后，我将考虑解构的一些可能影响。鉴于时间对于解构概念化的重要性，这些影响可能很严重。德里达说过，时间只能从现在开始思考。在《言语与现象》中，德里达特别指出，“'时间'总是指代一种根据现在构想的运动，没有别的意思”（德里达 1973, 68; 1967, 77）。这有那么清楚吗？使用德里德的术语，它是不可否认的吗？或许时间可以从过去与未来的差异、记忆与期待的差异、遗憾与希望的差异、宽慰与恐惧的差异开始思考。过去已定，未来已开；过去可以知道，未来不能。痕迹首先是对过去的痕迹。是否也有未来的痕迹？在《言语与现象》中，德里达首先参照胡塞尔的保留概念提出了“痕迹”的概念。保留是过去“保留”在现在；它是当下的不存在；同样，对于trace。我们可以问一下protention 是否也是如此。如果它也是一个痕迹，那么痕迹的概念就会建立过去和未来之间的对称性。回答这个问题并不容易，确定答案的困难——因为这个困难揭示了德里达的犹豫和承诺——与答案是什么一样重要。出于这个原因，我将追踪德里达在言语和现象以及“差异”和其他地方对痕迹与时间关系的描述。如果时间意味着过去和未来之间的不对称，那么我们将不得不重新思考“形而上学”的概念。形而上学仍然是对时间的否定，但从这个新的角度来看，它将包含一种消除过去与未来差异的哲学观点。这种观点将与德里达对形而上学的解释重叠——但划定了界限，因为在场的特权仍然是形而上学的，但只是抹去时间的一种方式。因此，解构本身是形而上学的，即使它无情地质疑和挑战“在场”，它也消除了过去和未来之间的差异。毫无疑问，这听起来很简单——对于了解德里达作品的人来说太简单了。我们都知道，德里达的思想是一种并发症。我们是什么