ABSTRACT The translation of honraisei as “authenticity” has caused scholars to compare Watsuji with Heideggerian and Taylorian accounts of authenticity. In this article, it will be demonstrated that this translation of “authenticity” is misleading insofar as it suggests a sense of subjective individuality as prevalent within Western philosophical thought. However, rather than rejecting a Watsujian account of authenticity, it will be argued that we can salvage this understanding by rethinking honraisei as a distinctly Japanese approach to authenticity and one which is underpinned by the Buddhist concept of emptiness.

中文翻译：

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Watsuji Tetsuro 的“真实性”概念

摘要 honraisei 被翻译为“真实性”，这导致学者将 Watsuji 与海德格尔和泰勒的真实性描述进行比较。在本文中，将证明这种对“真实性”的翻译具有误导性，因为它暗示了西方哲学思想中普遍存在的主观个性感。然而，与其拒绝 Watsujian 对真实性的描述，我们可以通过重新思考本来生作为一种明显的日本真实性方法和一种以佛教空性概念为基础的方法来挽救这种理解。