ABSTRACT

This essay suggests using harassment law as a mechanism for remedying defects in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” language which places an undue burden of proof on those trying to quell hate speech on campuses. The essay reviews noted failures and their causes in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” rulings. Currently, the First Amendment of the Constitution protects freedom of expression unless it presents “a clear and present danger,” is treasonous, obscene, libelous or slanderous. The initial “clear and present danger” standard laid out by Justice Holmes in the Schenck decision has been refined in several cases to create an even heavier burden of proof. Currently, based particularly on the Brandenburg v. Ohio and Virginia v. Black rulings, to be prosecutable, speech must be a “true threat,” which means person-specific, imminent, and possible. However, the Supreme Court has also protected hate speech by defining it as “viewpoint” in such case as Indiana v. Hess, Snyder v. Phelps, and Matal v. Tam. This essay concludes by exploring ways to circumvent the “true threat” and “viewpoint” standards by relying on harassment rulings and extending these precedents from the workplace to campus learning environments.

摘要

本文建议使用骚扰法作为纠正“真正威胁”和“视点保护”语言中的缺陷的机制，这给试图平息校园仇恨言论的人带来了不必要的举证责任。这篇文章的评论指出了“真正的威胁”和“观点保护”裁决中的失败及其原因。目前，《宪法第一修正案》保护言论自由，除非它构成叛国，淫秽，诽谤或诽谤，除非表现出“明显和当前的危险”。霍姆斯大法官在申克（Schenck）判决中提出的最初“明确和当前危险”标准在某些情况下已经过完善，以增加举证责任。目前，特别是根据勃兰登堡诉俄亥俄州和弗吉尼亚诉布莱克案裁决必须提起诉讼，才能予以起诉，这是“真正的威胁”，这意味着针对特定个人，迫在眉睫并且可能。但是，最高法院还通过将仇恨言论定义为“观点”来保护仇恨言论，例如Indiana诉Hess案，Snyder诉Phelps案和Matal诉Tam案。本文的结尾是探索各种方法，通过依赖于骚扰裁决来规避“真正的威胁”和“观点”标准，并将这些先例从工作场所扩展到校园学习环境。