ABSTRACT Crisis occupies an ambiguous place in the writings of Hannah Arendt. Not only does crisis undermine categories of judgment, but in doing so it eliminates prejudices as well, forcing us to judge without them. Although Arendt never had an opportunity to fully develop her understanding of judgment, we know that she considered it to be ‘the most political of man’s mental abilities,’ and her writings on education reflect this. In her essay, ‘The Crisis in Education’ she draws a connection between judgment and crisis, linking it to the work of the classroom. It is this relationship, between crisis and judgment, that I examine. In doing so, I turn to two figures central to Arendt’s work – Immanuel Kant and Adolf Eichmann – each of whom embody opposing aspects of what it means to judge, epitomized by a conceptual tension between example and cliché.

中文翻译：

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阿伦特的克里斯蒂

摘要危机在汉娜·阿伦特的作品中占据不明确的位置。危机不仅破坏了判断的范畴，而且这样做消除了偏见，迫使我们在没有偏见的情况下进行判断。尽管阿伦特（Arendt）从未有机会充分发展自己对判断力的理解，但我们知道她认为这是“人类政治能力中最政治化的”，她在教育方面的著作也反映了这一点。在她的论文《教育危机》中，她将判断与危机联系在一起，并将其与课堂工作联系起来。我研究的是危机与判断之间的这种关系。在此过程中，我将重点介绍两个对Arendt作品至关重要的人物-伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）和阿道夫·艾希曼（Adolf Eichmann），他们每个人都体现了判断意义的相反方面，