ABSTRACT This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebski’s Exemplarist Moral Theory, namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions.

中文翻译：

---

教育中的道德榜样：自由主义的叙述

摘要本文探讨了促进美德发展的典范主义策略，其具体目标是提高其在教育背景下的适用性。我认为，出于教育上重要的考虑，我们有充分的理由赞成对道德模范的自由主义解释。具体来说，我挑战了琳达·扎格布斯基的“经验主义道德理论”的两个关键假设，即道德楷模是格外善良的代理人，而模仿他们的行为是获得美德的主要策略。我将介绍和讨论吸引人的模范和不公正的照明器的概念，并表明我们有充分的理由考虑他们为道德的模范，尽管它们不能满足（两个）关键假设。