ABSTRACT In the Preface to Part Four of the Ethics, Spinoza offers the reader an exemplar of human nature. However, Spinoza does not conceive of human nature as a universal in which each human being participates, simply by virtue of being human. Rather, each human being is conceived as singular. Thriving individual lives assume thriving communities composed of (somewhat) like-minded and (somewhat) like-embodied individuals. The model, or exemplar, then, may be considered to play the role of an enabling fiction in his educational and moral philosophy. The approach taken here is to explore Spinoza’s notions of singularity, similarity, and exemplarity in relation to the distinctive human capacity to educate the senses and the passions and to cultivate reason, and thereby to flourish. The final section of the paper reads the education of Victor Frankenstein’s ‘monster’ through the lens of Spinoza’s philosophy of affect.

中文翻译：

---

斯宾诺莎哲学中的奇异性，相似性和典型性

摘要在《道德准则》第四部分的序言中，斯宾诺莎为读者提供了人性的典范。但是，斯宾诺莎没有将人类的本性想象成每个人都仅仅因为是人类而参与其中的普遍性。相反，每个人都被认为是单数的。蓬勃发展的个人生活假设了一个由（有点）志趣相投和（有些）志趣相投的人组成的繁荣社区。因此，可以认为该模型或样例在他的教育和道德哲学中起着使小说得以发展的作用。这里采取的方法是探索斯宾诺莎关于奇异，相似和模范的观念，这些观念与人类独特的教育感官和激情，养成理性从而发扬光大的能力有关。