Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh presents an intriguing interdisciplinary exploration of climate justice policy issues. He argues the important point that justice must be a key element of any climate regime, including within an MBI scheme. However, we find that his attempt to combine multiple disciplines ends up failing to sufficiently articulate ethical concepts or to apply those concepts to produce innovative climate policy solutions. We present two main critiques. First, we question whether Sayegh provides philosophically robust enough definitions of climate justice, the right to energy, and the duty notto-harm to accomplish his goal of creating a ‘normative relevance’ for those ideas in carbon pricing schemes. Second, we contend that Sayegh has not provided enough detail for his policy recommendations in terms of precision, scale, agency, and managing conflict with free-market ideology. To our first point, Sayegh’s overall ‘bottom-up’ strategy steers him away from providing what he calls ‘context-independent’ (pg. 6) definitions of the key ethical concepts at work in his essay. His rationale for this appears to be that interweaving these concepts through real-world policy discussions erases some artificial barriers between theory and practice which detailed conceptual definitions can sometimes create. He also goes so far as to say that making.

中文翻译：

---

亚历山大·加耶维奇·萨耶格（Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh）公开发表的“为气候正义定价碳”的同行评论

Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh对气候正义政策问题进行了有趣的跨学科探索。他认为重要的一点是，正义必须是任何气候制度的关键要素，包括在MBI计划中。但是，我们发现他试图将多个学科结合在一起的尝试最终未能充分阐明伦理学概念或将这些概念运用到创新的气候政策解决方案中。我们提出两个主要的批评。首先，我们质疑Sayegh是否在哲学上对气候正义，能源权和不损害义务提供了足够有力的定义，以实现他为碳定价计划中的这些想法创造“规范相关性”的目标。其次，我们认为Sayegh在准确性，规模，代理性，与自由市场意识形态的冲突。就我们的第一点而言，Sayegh的整体“自下而上”策略使他无法在论文中提供他所称的工作中关键道德概念的“上下文无关”（第6页）定义。他这样做的理由似乎是，通过现实世界中的政策讨论将这些概念交织在一起，可以消除理论与实践之间的一些人为障碍，而这些障碍有时会造成详细的概念定义。他还说那话。他这样做的理由似乎是，通过现实世界中的政策讨论将这些概念交织在一起，可以消除理论与实践之间的一些人为障碍，而这些障碍有时会造成详细的概念定义。他还说那话。他这样做的理由似乎是，通过现实世界中的政策讨论将这些概念交织在一起，可以消除理论与实践之间的一些人为障碍，而这些障碍有时会造成详细的概念定义。他还说那话。