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A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies
Advances in Accounting Pub Date : 2020-03-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2020.100455
Leif Appelgren

Abstract The problem studied in this survey is how to optimize the allocation of audit resources over an auditee population with respect to available population statistics. The auditees are assumed to optimize their expected utility based on information about the audit strategy. This survey is limited to models where the auditee can vary the fraud amount along a continuous scale. If the auditor is not able or willing to announce the audit strategy, a Nash equilibrium can be derived in which the auditor and auditee correctly anticipate each other's strategies. If the auditor announces the audit strategy in advance, the problem is formulated as a sequential game with perfect information which is solved as an optimization problem. Early models in the literature resulted in unrealistically high degrees of fraud. Later models have incorporated a split into one group of inherently honest auditees and another group of potentially dishonest auditees. The fraction of inherently honest auditees is exogenous. In this paper, the four combinations of non-announcing/pre-announcing the strategy and all potentially dishonest/some inherently honest auditees are studied. For the case of pre-announcing the strategy with some inherently honest auditees, two new solution methods are presented. Two main conclusions are as follows. First, models with some inherently honest auditees have greater external validity. Second, when a pre-announced strategy is feasible, as it often is with tax and benefit audits, the pre-announced strategy is preferred by the auditor over the non-announced strategy.

中文翻译:

确定最佳审计策略的模型调查

摘要本次调查研究的问题是如何根据可用的人口统计信息来优化被审计者对审计对象的资源分配。假定被审核方根据有关审核策略的信息来优化其预期效用。该调查仅限于被审计方可以在连续范围内更改欺诈金额的模型。如果审计师不能或不愿意宣布审计策略,则可以得出纳什均衡,其中审计师和被审计方可以正确地预测彼此的策略。如果审核员提前宣布审核策略,则将问题表述为具有完美信息的顺序博弈,并将其作为优化问题来解决。文献中的早期模型导致不切实际的高度欺诈。后来的模型将划分成一组固有诚实的受审核方和另一组可能不诚实的受审核方。内在诚实的被审核方的一部分是外生的。在本文中,研究了非宣布/预先宣布策略的四种组合以及所有潜在的不诚实/某些内在诚实的被审核方。对于与一些天生诚实的被审核方预先宣布该策略的情况,提出了两种新的解决方法。两个主要结论如下。首先,具有一些天生诚实的被审核方的模型具有更大的外部有效性。其次,当预先宣布的策略可行时(如税收和福利审计通常如此),审计员会优先采用预先宣布的策略,而不是未宣布的策略。
更新日期:2020-03-01
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