ABSTRACT

In this paper, I argue against international normative positivism, i.e., against the idea that the separation of international legal judgement from moral reasoning is not only possible, but also a good thing. First, I claim that the space for the separation of legal and moral reasoning is minimal in this legal realm, given the peculiar characteristics of the international legal system. And then, I try to show that nonpositivism in international law (i) does not lead to quietism regarding the rules, (ii) or regarding the system as a whole, (iii) that it does not give too much power to international judges, or (iv) work against democratic values, (v) that it does not lead to anarchy, and that it (vi) may not be an instrument of imperialism, but rather a tool against it.

摘要

在本文中，我反对国际规范实证主义，即反对将国际法律判断与道德推理分开不仅是可能的，而且是一件好事。首先，鉴于国际法律体系的特殊性，我认为在这个法律领域中，法律推理和道德推理的分离空间是最小的。然后，我试图表明国际法中的非实证主义 (i) 不会导致对规则的沉默，(ii) 或对整个体系的沉默，(iii) 它不会赋予国际法官太多权力，或 (iv) 反对民主价值观， (v) 它不会导致无政府状态，并且 (vi) 可能不是帝国主义的工具，而是反对它的工具。