ABSTRACT

The dominant theoretical approach to the prohibition of exclusionary conduct in competition law distinguishes exclusionary conduct from normal competitive conduct based on their economic outcomes. However, this approach fails to provide a uniform and consistent test for distinguishing the two categories. This article outlines a new account of the wrongness of exclusionary conduct that integrates consequentialist factors within the deontological framework of the moral duty to promote the common good. Exclusionary conduct is wrong because it undermines the role of markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that harms the competitive process and social welfare. The prohibition arises from the moral duty to promote the common good in combination with evolved social and economic norms. This approach helps make sense of the distinction between exclusionary conduct and normal competitive behaviour. The article explores and applies this account to the European Union approach to the prohibition of exclusionary conduct under the legal framework provided by art 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

摘要

竞争法中禁止排他性行为的主要理论方法根据其经济结果将排他性行为与正常竞争行为区分开来。但是，这种方法无法提供统一和一致的测试来区分这两个类别。本文概述了对排除性行为的错误的新解释，该行为将结果主义因素整合到促进共同利益的道德义务的道义框架内。排他性行为是错误的，因为它以损害竞争过程和社会福利的方式破坏了市场作为对重要社会协调问题的突出反应的作用。该禁令源于道德义务，即促进共同利益与进化的社会和经济规范相结合。这种方法有助于理解排斥行为和正常竞争行为之间的区别。本文探讨了这一解释并将其应用于欧盟在《欧盟运作条约》第 102 条规定的法律框架下禁止排斥行为的方法。