ABSTRACT

State legislatures in the United States began using the legislative veto in 1939 to block rules issued by state agencies. At present, 25 state legislatures possess some form of independent legislative veto authority. This study uses a transaction cost theoretical approach to analyse factors expected to influence the adoption and expansion of legislative veto oversight. Results indicate that such measures are more likely in non-Southern states when a single party controls the state legislature, while legislative size and professionalisation do not substantially affect legislative veto reforms. Empirical analysis differentiating veto power according to whether legislators can nullify or suspend rules shows some differences in the factors affecting the imposition of each oversight type. The most consistent finding is that empowering legislatures with legislative veto authority is more likely to occur with a Republican governor in office.

摘要

美国的州立法机构于 1939 年开始使用立法否决权来阻止州机构发布的规则。目前，25 个州立法机构拥有某种形式的独立立法否决权。本研究使用交易成本理论方法来分析预计会影响立法否决权监督的采用和扩大的因素。结果表明，当单一政党控制州立法机构时，在非南方各州更有可能采取此类措施，而立法规模和专业化不会对立法否决权改革产生实质性影响。根据立法者是否可以废除或暂停规则来区分否决权的实证分析表明，影响每种监督类型施加的因素存在一些差异。