ABSTRACT

Can members of Congress escape blame for bad news in their districts? To maximise their chances of re-election, legislators seek to maintain their electoral connections with voters, defending key district interests. Could actions by successive presidential administrations over the past three decades to close obsolete military bases have undermined such efforts? Although Congress and the president have deployed Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commissions to facilitate such closures and insulate individual members of Congress from directly traceable costs of those decisions, the electoral implications of base closures have yet to be fully probed. Focusing on the House of Representatives, I examine all major BRAC closings, and find that major base closures do not affect the electoral fortunes of incumbents. Rather, voters predominantly and typically punish the president’s party and first-term lawmakers during these elections. I conclude that Congressional fears about the electoral costs of base closings are likely unfounded.

摘要

国会议员能否因所在地区的坏消息而逃脱责备？为了最大限度地提高他们的重新选举机会，立法者寻求与选民的选举联系，捍卫关键地区利益。过去三十年来，历届总统政府为关闭过时的军事基地而采取的行动是否会破坏这种努力？尽管国会和总统已经部署了基地调整和关闭 (BRAC) 委员会来促进此类关闭，并使国会个别成员免受这些决定的直接可追溯成本的影响，但基地关闭对选举的影响尚未得到充分探讨。以众议院为中心，我检查了所有主要的 BRAC 关闭，发现主要的基地关闭不会影响在职者的选举命运。相当，在这些选举中，选民主要并且通常会惩罚总统所在的政党和第一任期的立法者。我的结论是，国会对关闭基地的选举成本的担忧可能是没有根据的。